Algorítmico e não-algorítmico (1)

Descartes and Locke, and more recently Edgar Allan Poe, Kurt Godel, and J. R. Lucas, thought that the alternative to a "mechanical" mind would be an immaterial mind, or a soul, to speak with tradition. Hubert Dreyfus and John Searle, more recent skeptics about AI, have shunned such dualism and opined that the mind is indeed just the brain, but the brain is not any ordinary computer; it has "causal powers" (...) that go beyond the running of any algorithms. Neither Dreyfus nor Searle has been very forthcoming about what special powers these might be, or which of the physical sciences might be the right one to give an account of them, but others have wondered whether phisics might hold the key. To many of them, Penrose appears to be a knight in shining armor.

Daniel Dennett, Darwin's dangerous idea, p. 445.